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EVEN AS historians express misgivings over the special terms they use to
capture twelfth-century lustre, most appear hesitant to relinquish the well-
known catch-phrases. We still hear of “renaissance,” “renewal,” and
“humanism,” though such expressions tend to be malleable, bent by cau-
tioning qualifications to ward off anachronism. We also find the age envi-
saged as one of “discoveries,” including that of the individual and romantic
love, again with qualifications made to warrant such usage.1 Even the tem-
poral markers of the period, 1060–1230, seem lavish, indicating an expan-
siveness that the ordinary reckoning of a mere hundred years cannot
contain.2 Indeed, historians refer to the era as “the long twelfth
century,” a neat way of saying that, as far as centuries go, this one is so
special, it begins early and ends late. The twelfth century, then, is
1 On the terms and scholarly trends, see Caroline Walker Bynum, “Did the Twelfth Century Discover
the Individual?” Journal of Ecclesiastical History, vol. 31 (1980), pp. 1–17, with the reply of Colin
Morris, “Individualism in Twelfth Century Religion: Some Further Reflections,” Journal of
Ecclesiastical History, vol. 31 (1980), pp. 195–206. For a revised and expanded version of Bynum’s
essay, see Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1982), pp. 82–209; and, more recently, Susan R. Kramer and Caroline Walker
Bynum, “Revisiting the Twelfth-Century Individual: The Inner Self and the Christian Community”
in Gert Melville and Markus Schu¨rer, eds., Das Eigene und das Ganze: Zum Individuellen in
mittelalterlichen Reiligiosentum (Mu¨nster: Lit, 2002), pp. 57–88.
2 The temporal expansiveness is also noted by R. M. Thomson, “Richard Southern and the Twelfth-
Century Intellectual World: Review of R. W. Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of
Europe, Vol. I: Foundations; Vol. II: The Heroic Age,” Journal of Religious History, vol. 26 (2002),
p. 266: “Southern’s twelfth-century renaissance . . . emphatically embraces the thirteenth as well.”
Thompson also states his reservations with such periodisation (p. 269).
magnificent, and, as C. Stephen Jaeger has noticed, we tend to like rhetoric
that keeps it that way.3 Consider, for instance, the word “renaissance” in
the modern scholarship on the period. Jaeger, a rare proponent for “scrap-
ping the term,” generously sums up why it persists:
The term rests — legitimately — on the argument from grandeur. And who
will refute that argument? The twelfth century is a great and fascinating age,
probably of the long stretch of the “Middle Ages” the period whose remark-
able individuals and high accomplishments have provoked and inspired the
most and best scholarship: its exhilarating intellectual life, the growth of inde-
pendent schools and famed teachers in Paris, the rise of the Universities of
Bologna and Paris; the great Gothic cathedrals and abbey churches of
England; Gothic style in architecture, book illustration, and handcraft
design; a new classicism, plasticity, and humanity in the representation of
the human body in sculpture; the grand poetic-philosophical-ethical visions
of Benrnard Silvestris, Alan of Lille, and John Hanville. . ... We have credited
the age with the “discovery” or the rediscovery, or even the “invention,” of
individuality, philosophical rationalism, and romantic love.4
The list goes on. Many of us have heard it before, perhaps in a lecture
hall: “Particularly striking,” notes Jaeger, “is the number of university
courses” bearing the title “twelfth-century renaissance.” For those of us
enticed by such talk, the volumes of scholars whose names and accom-
plishments sound as dignified as the era — think of Charles Homer
Haskins or Sir Richard Southern — have enhanced our image of
twelfth-century grandeur.5 Among the characteristics heralded by histor-
ians, however, we do not usually find violence identified as one of the
age’s common features. Of course, such an observation is not meant to
imply a prevailing imperviousness to the period’s capacity for brutality.
On the contrary, even an undergraduate who nodded off during a class
on the period’s grandeur would likely be able to give an example or two
of twelfth-century violence — Abelard’s famous castration, for instance,
or a crusade. Others keener on this span of time might also cite the
destructiveness of the Norman Conquest or the truculence of the
3 In addition to the studies cited in note 1, Jaeger gives ample bibliographical references related to the
debated terms and scholarly trends in “Pessimism in the Twelfth-Century ‘Renaissance’,” Speculum,
vol. 78 (2003), p. 1151, n. 1.
4 Ibid., p. 1152.
5 Ibid., p. 1151, n. 1. Charles Homer Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge, MA,
1927; reprint New York, 1955). The twelfth century figures prominently in the work of R. W. Southern;
in addition to the two volumes of Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1995), see also his The Making of the Middle Ages (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1959), especially pp. 219–257, along with Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1970).
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Investiture Conflict or the murders of Charles the Good and Thomas
Beckett.
On a small and large scale, then, the violence of this period is nothing
new to us; if anything, our knowledge of its uses and our study of its multi-
valent interpretations among mediaeval contemporaries enable us to view
it with a precision and complexity like never before.6 However, there are
other accounts of violence that scholars, suspicious of hyperbole, seem
reluctant to accept as an accurate gauge of the period’s turmoil — at
least, the first book under consideration gives that impression. This vio-
lence is less isolated than a famous canon’s castration, but more “banal”
than a holy war. It is “arbitrary,” persistent, and perhaps so common
that it cannot be distinguished from custom. Significantly, this violence
also registers a “crisis.” What is this crisis of which violence is the salient
symptom? The immense work of Thomas N. Bisson formulates an
answer, with a scene in the book’s crystallizing epilogue furnishing, argu-
ably, the most telling example of it. Pondering an episode highlighting the
abuse of a subordinate’s power, the author presents “a poor villager
named Durand, who told investigators that a bailiff of his place
(Langlade, not far from Nıˆmes) had bullied him so badly that he had
felt compelled to flee; and that as he tried to go away, the bailiff intimi-
dated him by forcing excrement into his mouth” (p. 581).
So much for twelfth-century “humanism” — or so those of us not used
to finding “excrement” listed in the descriptions of grandeur might be
tempted to say. But even in light of such evidence — and Bisson supplies
plenty of it — dispensing with the historiography that privileges sources
indicative of the twelfth century’s high cultural achievements is hardly
called for. As challenging as the book’s thesis is to our received ideas of
the period, the author has not “intended to substitute ‘crisis’ for
‘Renaissance’: the twelfth century, with its luxuriant legacy of records
and artifacts, is far too vast to be comprehended in a single perspective”
(p. x). Indeed, rather than displacing the scholarship we are accustomed
to find on the twelfth century, all three books under consideration here,
6 See, especially, the wide-ranging essays in Thomas Head and Richard Landes, eds., The Peace of God:
Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the Year 1000 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1992); see also Stephen D. White, “Debate: The ‘Feudal Revolution’,” Past & Present, no.
152 (1996), pp. 205–223. White writes in response to Thomas N. Bisson, “The Feudal Revolution,”
Past & Present, no. 142 (1994), pp. 6–42, who rearticulates his argument in The Crisis of the
Twelfth Century, discussed here. Bisson’s positions on the period’s violence and changes elicited
strong responses, worth examining for those who, like the present writer, are not specialists in the
economic and social changes but are interested in learning more about the historical controversies
surrounding issues revisited in The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Dominique Barthe´lemy, “Debate:
The ‘Feudal Revolution’,” Past & Present, no. 152 (1996), pp. 196–205; Timothy Reuter, “Debate:
The ‘Feudal Revolution’,” Past & Present, no. 155 (1997), pp. 177–195; Chris Wickham, “Debate:
The ‘Feudal Revolution’,” Past & Present, no. 155 (1997), pp. 196–208, with Bisson’s “Reply,” Past
& Present, no. 155 (1997), pp. 208–225.
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to borrow a phrase from the first one, make a “turn of the lens” through
which we have been perceiving the period (Bisson, p. 578). In each turn,
we see the disruptions of proliferating lordships rather than government
(Bisson), the multifaceted expressions of doubt among faithful
Christians (Sabina Flanagan), and a blue streak among writers even as
they turned to an ancient source of consolation (Bridget K. Balint). To
the authors’ credit, taken together their works offer fresh perspectives
on the twelfth century that may be viewed profitably alongside the
visions of grandeur, with each study showing, respectively, the era’s experi-
ence of power, uncertainty, and pessimism.
Conceptual Confusion
The experience of power, on which the first book concentrates, comes
most obviously in the form of violence, “allusions to which are . . . deafen-
ingly frequent,” if not very well heard (Bisson, p. 6). In Bisson’s view, the
countless records of brutality have been falling on the deaf ears of scholars
who tend to “tune out” the violence. Why this reluctance to listen? The
documents exaggerate and are “self-serving”: often they represent the
church’s position by providing well-rehearsed, hyperbolic invectives of
ecclesiastics embroiled in property disputes with laymen. To Bisson,
however, such exaggerations of violence are “impressively informative”
for the way “truth filters through” them (pp. 61, 250). Moreover, when
we actually listen to the accounts, we hear more than just brute force: a
mentality is detectable, one that might easily escape our notice were it
not for Bisson’s attentiveness to the way a common phrase can be
freighted with the period’s cataclysm. Put in another way, what is striking
about the incident involving the man from Langlade is not so much the
cruelty he endured, but what he is reported to have said as he endured
it; what he said tells us about a blurring of categories in the conception
of social hierarchy, and that blurring lays bare the crisis of the twelfth
century. With the villagers watching the intimidation, Durand responded
to his abuser, “You can do it, as lord and bailiff of the village.” Why
was the aggressor called both titles when bailiffs should be agents of
lords? This ambiguity in the simple utterance elicits Bisson’s final reflec-
tion, worth quoting at length not only for its succinct re-articulation of
the book’s argument, but also because the author’s final comment offers
a humble yet stirring call to reconsider something crucial, though little
understood, about the period:
Lord and bailiff? Was that conceptual confusion still normal in Durand’s
society? Was it not, indeed, the abiding crisis of the twelfth century? The
inability of agents to exercise power on accountable terms, to behave as ser-
vants not masters, was to be its conspicuous legacy in later medieval Europe.
Justice, law, accountability, office and election, the perception and debate of
causes: all these, of which only the first two or three were yet functions of
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record, were waiting in the wings. How little we know about the human
experience of power! Yet the evidence is there, however problematic it
may seem. In the end it is the image of Durand that prevails: the haunting
image of an ignorant peasant in Languedoc — “poor, simple, on bended
knees,” these were the scribe’s words — who could imagine no better
world than his old one of arbitrary lordship, the only world he had ever
known; a shared culture not so much of rights as of power: the pitiless, dis-
dainful power into which his tormentor had so easily lapsed. “You can do
it,” for you have the power. It is for us to imagine in his place. (p. 582)
That closing admirably sums up a study whose breadth, both in terms of
the abundant sources treated — they range from charters to troubadour
songs — and the regions represented — “the societies that succeeded
Charlemagne’s west-Frankish dominions . . . Leo´n-Castile, England,
Lombardy, Bavaria, Saxony and Poland” (p. ix) — is remarkable.
Certainly, running through the whole inquiry is an appreciation for differ-
ence, but the comparative approach yields findings that are generally appli-
cable. Based on such an inclusive analysis of texts of wide-ranging genres
and geographic scope, Europe appears under the strain of a societal trans-
formation arising from the growth of lordships. The bailiff mentioned
earlier was supposed to be an underling, but the sort of force he exercised
over the peasant exemplified one way in which those who aspired to dom-
inate attained lordly power. Castellans, knights, provosts, and the like —
that is, people capable of exercising power but not belonging to the prin-
cely cast — craved the status of lords (see p. 56). Around the year 1000 the
world of elite nobles, who were few in number, was “passing,” as “power
devolved to lesser mortals through usurpation and default” (pp. 7, 24).
“More and more” of these petty lords “were pretending to noble
powers and inevitable status” (p. 7). Exactly how all this occurred
remains “an unsolved problem of history” (p. 24), but we do know, as
Marc Bloch had once detected, that the submission to lords became
almost ubiquitous by the end of the ninth century. Enabling the surge of
aspiring dominators was pronounced economic and demographic
change, specifically, an increase in wealth and population (see pp. 212–
213). Thus more people with “the means and will to coerce others,”
together with the attenuation of public officials theoretically responsible
for keeping the peace, eventually led to the experience of power that
Durand knew all too well (p. 7). This crisis was not played out as class con-
flict between poor and rich, however. Durand, remember, could not
imagine a world without lords. The issue at stake was really the role of
power-bearers, the diminishing of the old potentes and the burgeoning of
the new ones. The crisis unfolded in the post-Carolingian centuries, as
the fragile legacy of government gave way to those “militant new men”
with the urge and wherewithal to dominate (p. 7). As representatives of
government lost their hold on the public exercise of power, the “abrasive,”
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exploitative personal power of banal lords flourished (p. 48). The increase
in the rise of this power had its concrete expression in the explosion of
castles, “the leverage of lordship,” which cast their shadows over the dwell-
ings, fields, and churches where anxious peasants, monks, and clerics con-
ducted their lives (pp. 41, 241).
Life under the shadow of violence is what Bisson captures. He has such
an existence in mind when introducing Alan of Lille’s notion of three
kinds of peace. Besides the “eternal peace of God,” there is the praise-
worthy pursuit of peace based on intention, that is, the “peace of con-
science,” which the virtuous person, battling the vices, seeks. There is
yet another kind of peace that has no lasting or reliable quality. It
hardly seems real. This is the “peace of the times,” characterized as “illu-
sory and slippery.” It is a mere “shadow of peace” (p. 471). Ecclesiastical
responses, such as the various peace councils, tried to resist this “sha-
dowed reality,” and the resistance, if largely futile, became concerted.
Bisson notes that “from 1148 to 1195 normative institutes of peace
were promulgated in almost every country and diocese between the
Pyrenees and the Alps” (p. 472). Yet such initiatives, while marking “a
new stage in the history of medieval peace,” are also “proof of the
violence they aim to remedy.” Thus peace movements “breaking out
everywhere in Europe” were the surest indicators of the “incessant
failure of territorial justice” (pp. 471–473). Of course, there were
other ways to try to curb the violence, for shame too could be “a
mode of pacification”: a contrite knight might be moved to repent in
public before holy relics (p. 483), and compunction, too, could induce
a fit of conversion (see p. 287). Occasionally, severer measures were
taken, say, the “memorably gruesome” boiling alive of a “fully armed
knight” (p. 150). More often, though, it seems that “Christ and his
saints slept” while the castles went up and the lordly pretenders harassed
working people (p. 276). Significantly, it is out of this turmoil that prin-
cely justice emerges (or re-emerges, if one believes that the Carolingian
world had such public order). Thus government, of which only the fore-
shadowing may be detected in the twelfth century, came as a compromis-
ing response to coercive lordships, which gradually and grudgingly gave
way to the “collective interests” and public power associated with office
rather than persons (p. 580). Under the “shadowed peace,” then, the
“growing pains” indicative of the origins of European government may
be heard (p. 9).
Of course, no summary can adequately encapsulate the nearly 600 pages
in which Bisson’s argument unfolds. What is more, the impression of vio-
lence is so strong that we can easily lose sight of the book’s nuances, some
of which Bisson himself had made explicit earlier as part of his reply to
critics debating, in journal articles, his position on the “feudal revolution.”
What is not being claimed is as important to note as what is. However dis-
ordered and beyond the reach of government Bisson’s twelfth-century
462 Histoire sociale / Social History
seems, the situation is not called anarchy.7 Some “fac¸ade” of public order
persisted (pp. 136–137). Moreover, as widespread as the violence was, he
does not claim that everyone experienced it. Even lordship was “not inher-
ently vicious,” for “everywhere personal powers over people expanded
benignly in the hands of princes, barons, bishops, abbots and priors”
(p. 64). Yet, at the same time, “almost everywhere” the temptations of
(what the sources call) “bad lordship” — that is, the coercing of com-
moners into forced labour, the plundering of churches, the arbitrary
taxing (“tallage”), the violating of defenceless men’s wives and daughters,
the taking of captives to gain ransoms, and the demanding of protection
money from the vulnerable — were often too great for ambitious and
armed men to resist. How would villagers like those of Durand’s commu-
nity know the difference between the lordly pretenders, mounted and
mailed as they descended their stony, hilltop encampments, and the real
thing? Was there any real difference?
To answer that question, consider one of the most “deeply illuminating”
and well-documented cases Bisson treats, the Capuchins of Velay (p. 475).
Their leader, also called Durand, was a “poor carpenter” fed up with the
“local violence.” In 1182 he first appealed to Bishop Peire of Le Puy to
restore order. After the bishop “rebuffed” him, Durand took matters
into his own hands. He managed to get hundreds to swear to a “pact of
peace” (p. 476). The number of his supporters then “swelled” to 5,000
by one account. They established “institutes of peace,” which consisted
of “a uniform code of dress, a solemn oath preceded by confession of
sins,” and, to support the cause, various payments from the brothers
who joined. They made vows “to fight when summoned” (p. 476). Their
hooded dress was striking, too: “white capes with cloth pendants front
and back resembling the woolen pallium worn by archbishops.” Looking
like clergy, they were “a visible moral force” (p. 476). On the front they
bore “an image of the Virgin and Son,” encircled with an inscription
whose well-known words linked the movement to sacrifice, the removal
of sin, and, most significant given the context of regional violence, pacifi-
cation: Agnus Dei, qui tollis peccata mundi, dona nobis pacem. Durand’s
initial success actualized the inscription. By the Feast of the Assumption
(August 15, 1183), the bishop had confirmed the carpenter’s institutia;
with the backing of “knights . . . ‘princes, bishops, abbots, monks, clerics,
and women without husbands’,” the “Castle-dun” was attacked. The right-
eous killing included “‘a prince of robbers’ together with many hundreds
of coterels” (p. 476).
These measures to bring justice to the region all sound so hopeful and
appealing to us, for they are “rational and socially purposive: the solemn
oath, surely bound to the commitment to fight when summoned, the
7 See Bisson, “Reply,” p. 211.
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pecuniary assessment and the uniform” (p. 479). Durand’s group seemed
to present something resembling government. However, the movement
“collapsed.” The group had no lords to whom they were accountable,
and life without lords, as the response from the peasant of Langlade illus-
trates, was as difficult to imagine as it was menacing to the bearers of
power. In the organization’s early stages, Durand’s community must
have been able to maintain the distinction between the “magnates” who
supported the cause and the “robbers,” for without that difference the
endorsement of the Capuchins by local potentes would not have been
given. The distinction was short-lived. Once members of Durand’s group
threatened the lords who had initially favoured the institutes, once some
of the Capuchins “relished the idea of getting even” — in other words,
once the group became subversive to lordship itself, so that the original
distinction between robbers and princes was no longer maintained —
the group was discredited, likened to heretics with an excessive penitential
streak (pp. 479, 481). Durand’s movement thus receded into the shadowed
peace of the Massif Central.
Tipplers
The externalized and regional “peace of the times,” which Alan of Lille
thought shadowy, had an internal corollary. Thanks to the account of
one contemporary, it is not too hard for us to appreciate how the violence
and disorder arising from the Investiture Conflict (1075–1085), along with
the vexation of choosing sides, could trigger the onslaught of doubt,
described as a dark, enveloping cloud. Here is what Wido of Osnabru¨ck
said as he situated himself among the partisans in the battles between
Pope Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV:
Often I reflect how many people there are in support of each party, and how
they are as well advanced in learning as men can be, and most serious-
minded, and how it would therefore be wrong to believe that one side or
the other is deliberately acting in defiance of justice or of the peace of the
church. So I find that my own small judgment begins to waver, and I am
covered with a dark cloud of doubt.8
Given that doubt, in all its varieties, has received relatively little attention
from mediaevalists, Sabina Flanagan’s Doubt in the Age of Faith is most
welcome. The passage just quoted offers a rather conspicuous instance
8 Excerta ex Widonis Osnarugensis libro de controversia inter Hilderbrandum et Heinricum imperatorem,
ed. L. de Heinemann in Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Libelli de lite, vol. 1 (Hannover: Impensis
Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1981), p. 462. For the translation, with brief comments, see Colin Morris, The
Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989),
p. 126.
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of doubt arising from one of the period’s most disruptive events; it is also
an example of the way the state of uncertainty is often presented figura-
tively, with dark and foggy attributes. While neither the Investiture
Conflict as an occasion for indecisiveness nor the specific imagery of a
dark cloud as a rhetorical topos of uncertainty are addressed at length
in her study, Flanagan’s presentation of doubt nonetheless can enhance
our appreciation of another aspect to the above quotation — the sense
of motion to capture the experience of doubting. “To begin to waver”
or, as Wido puts it, “incipit vacillare,” certainly conveys such movement,
as does the verb “fluctuate,” also derived from Latin. Thus there
emerges in her early discussion of “what doubt means” a vivid back-
and-forth quality to this mental state, which writers describe in terms of
physical effects. Doubt is a “teetering,” a “wobbling,” a “to-ing and fro-
ing.” In comparison to English, Latin has “a greater number of metapho-
rical doubt-words” (p. 2). Of the more “colourful” terms Flanagan cites,
one in particular has the advantage of conveying both doubt’s unsteadi-
ness and its capacity to cloud the mind; it is a verb classical authors
would have also used to describe a bibulous guest’s ungainly departure
from a banquet. The word is titubare, which, besides signifying a state of
absolute uncertainty, means “to stagger drunkenly.” Such are doubt’s con-
notations, and they inform the book’s image for conceptualizing this con-
dition, an image that keeps the sense of movement intact, for doubt is
measured on a sliding scale: neither an affirmation nor denial, it leans in
degrees toward one direction or the other, capable of increasing or decreas-
ing in accordance with the doubter’s judgement. There is, then — and
Flanagan’s book, from beginning to end, illustrates this point most
effectively — a rich and great range to the twelfth-century experience of
doubt.
Doubt’s many forms make the devising of a system by which to classify
it especially challenging. After considering possible approaches, Flanagan
proposes a “radically simple division” to categorize doubt according to its
“worldly” and “spiritual” manifestations (chapters 2 and 3), with the dis-
tinction between the sacred and profane being one that “would have made
sense to medieval people” (p. 8). However, given that the interconnected-
ness of mediaeval religion and society also deserves to be taken into
account, perhaps Flanagan’s radical distinction needs, at times, some
refinement. For instance, certain examples she gives of “secular” doubt
entail the settling of an uncertain issue through the use of divination
and prognostication, alternative religious practices that — and this too
would seem to weaken the category’s integrity — ecclesiastical writers
condemned as diabolical. While the concerns may have been “worldly,”
they were often addressed, as the second chapter shows, by appealing to
“supernatural guidance” (p. 16). Unambiguous species of doubt, then,
may not be as easy to identify as the book’s initial division suggests.
Consider again Wido’s dark cloud (dubitationis caligo). How should that
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doubt be classified, as temporal or spiritual? The issue seems difficult to
label as one or the other. Investiture, after all, underscores the period’s
intractable mingling of the secular and the sacred.
Whatever reservations readers may find with the categories, Flanagan’s
book does a great service for showing the many ways doubt crept into
twelfth-century life. Like Bisson, she is after a specific kind of twelfth-
century experience. Much of Flanagan’s inquiry tries to capture the experi-
ence of doubt episodically, by briefly presenting texts addressing its
“nature,” “benefits,” and “disadvantages” (chapters 4, 5, and 6).
In addition to surveying doubt as a twelfth-century phenomenon, the
inquiry also takes up scholarship treating attitudes toward Jews, whose reli-
gious difference gave rise to debatable questions for Christians to consider.
The encounter with Jews, then, could lead to doubts for Christians that
might entail social and spiritual risks. Some took them. Herbert of
Bosham (d. 1194) likely enjoyed “close and amicable relationships with
Jewish scholars in order to reach the exceptional level of linguistic compe-
tence in Hebrew that has been ascribed to him” (p. 175). Following the
lead of Deborah L. Goodwin, Flanagan notes that Herbert’s knowledge
of the Psalms “led him to a remarkably positive attitude towards the
Jews,” who, he thought, would be “redeemed by their own Messiah
rather than simply absorbed as the ‘Jewish remnant’ into Christianity”
(p. 175).9 Reflecting his encounter with Judaism, Herbert’s doubt revolved
around the question of transubstantiation, a question entangled in his
uncertainty over the historical appearance of the Christian Messiah. He
began to wonder whether the sacrament of the Eucharist was “justified
at all” and even “whether Jesus was indeed the Messiah.” He dreamed
of his chalice wavering. But his doubt was alleviated when he acknowl-
edged that, even if “‘there were not a sacramental conversion of the
bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ,’ its usage would be a
more pleasing sacrifice to God than the bloody offerings of the synagogue”
(p. 84).
The works of Herbert, along with the writings of his contemporaries
Baldwin of Fiorde and Peter the Venerable, offer a way for Flanagan to
test the thesis of Gavin Langmuir, who argued that the “internal frontiers
of faith were threatened by doubts” arising from the presence of Jews in a
Christian society that was also experiencing, as part of the twelfth-century
renewal, “a new emphasis on empirical knowledge as well as logic”
(p. 162).10 Within this context of renewed rationality, and when faced
with Jewish disbelief, Christians experienced doubts that could not
9 For sustained treatment of Herbert’s attitudes, see Deborah L. Goodwin, Take Hold of the Robe of a
Jew: Herbert of Bosham’s Christian Hebraism (Leiden: Brill, 2006).
10 Flanagan is quoting Gavin Langmuir, Toward a Definition of Antisemitism (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990), p. 9.
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always be openly acknowledged, but that found irrational expression in the
paranoia and violence characteristic of the intolerance and repressiveness
often associated with mediaeval society. Peter the Venerable, Cluny’s
abbot at a time when the monastery might have been in debt to Jews, is
certainly one example of prominent Christian intolerance (p. 173). Yet,
after examining the sources, Flanagan finds reasons to challenge
Langmuir’s position, asserting that it cannot account for the case of
Herbert, who was in close contact with Jews and the Hebrew Bible, but
whose religious doubts were not, ultimately, threatening to his faith; nor
did his doubts vent themselves in paranoid and dehumanizing contra-
Judeos invective or violence. As for Peter the Venerable, who did dehuma-
nize Jews by likening them to animals, Flanagan is emphatic that doubt
was not the motivating factor of the abbot’s animus. Quite the opposite:
“rather than doubt being implicated in his extremely hostile attitude
towards contemporary Jews, it would seem that misplaced certainty was
the cause” (p. 183).
Torn Dresses
There are other valuable surprises in Flanagan’s study, such as the compari-
son between Anselm of Canturbury and Abelard, with the former rather
than the latter emerging as the more radical doubter — not what we
might expect when we think of Abelard’s famous saying in his Sic et Non
(p. 145).11 We also see — and the comparison Flanagan later makes with
the modern “advice columns” of newspapers is also apt here — esteemed
figures implored by doubters to resolve their conundrums. Hildegard of
Bingen, for instance, received the pestering inquiries of monks whose
minds were riddled with uncertainties (pp. 61–63). Significantly,
Hildegard also sensed that doubt could lead to despair, which she personi-
fied “as a woman dressed entirely in clothing of dark and gloomy hue”
(p. 96).
In garments less evocative of bleakness comes another personification,
that of philosophy. As a famous text from Late Antiquity presents her,
Lady Philosophy appears to Boethius in his prison cell. The Consolation
of Philosophy was one of the most widely studied classics during the
Middle Ages, and its imprisoned author, executed by Theoderic in 524,
is instructed by Philosophy to recognize the fickleness of fortune and
embrace the surer comforts of reason. Though not as dark as
Hildegard’s personified doubt, there is still a touch of sadness represented
by Lady Philosophy’s clothing. When she appears to Boethius, she wears a
torn dress, indicative of the rift between philosophical schools.
11 “By doubting we come to question and by questioning we reach the truth.” See Flanagan, Doubt,
pp. 12–13, with Blanch B. Boyer and Richard McKeon, eds., Sic et Non (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1976–1977), p. 103.
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Similar personifications are represented in the works of five twelfth-
century authors who, between 1100 and 1170, revived the Consolation’s
genre, a mixture of poetry and prose, thought to be a combination of
“pleasure” (dulce) and utility (utile), called by Bridgit Balint, in her
Ordering Chaos, “Boethian prosimetrum” (pp. 8, 18). The twelfth-
century revival of the genre was short-lived, and Balint provides a clear
and compelling study that addresses the circumstances surrounding the
revival and decline of this literary form. Her relatively short book offers
close readings of the works produced by the period’s principal prac-
titioners of this distinctive though fleeting genre: Hildebert of Lavardin
(1056–1133), Adelard of Bath (c. 1080–c. 1152), Lawrence of Durham
(c. 1114–1154), Bernard Silvestris (“magister at Tours 1130s–1160s”),
and the previously mentioned Alan of Lille (c. 1120–1203) (pp. 9–11).
There are aspects to the inquiry that also recall the situation Bisson has
uncovered. Surely, the fact that Lady Philosophy appears in the
Consolation as a rape victim would have resonated in a time of “shadowed
peace” (p. 45). The authors are also deeply occupied with the question of
whether it is possible to find “order” amidst the “chaos” and “disturb-
ance” of the world (p. 7). What is more, one of the authors, Adelard,
“speaks as a knight of argumentative . . . prowess” (p. 53). Flanagan’s
work, too, finds echoes in Balint’s study on a number of central issues:
the prosmetrum writers show the give and take of dialogues resistant to
closure on debatable matters; portray the interlocutors fluctuating
between hope and despair; are almost all tinged with pessimism
(Bernard is the exception) arising from uncertainties over the ability of
reason to solve the problem of human existence; find the relationship of
language to truth vitiated; and are also hesitant, as Boethius was not, to
offer reassurances when faced with life’s most troubling questions. In
short, the world of the prosimetrum writer was highly unstable.
What is especially useful is the way Balint historically contextualizes the
uncertainty and reluctance to give definitive answers with a change in
reading practices. Important works such as the Consolation of
Philosophy were often preceded by an introduction (accessus), which
offered either “a list of the topics of rhetorical invention” or gave “infor-
mation on the life of the author, the circumstances of composition, and the
title and order of the text itself.” Such introductions “presented the text . . .
as authoritative, without further evaluation of its contents” (p. 37). A
change in the prefacing matter occurred in the twelfth century, with
another kind of introduction being preferred. This “new type of accessus”
focused on “the material of the text, the author’s intention, the utility of
the text, and its place in the universal scheme of knowledge.” A “subjec-
tive” element thus came into play. The change “created a space in which
the reader might disagree with the accessus-writer, and admitted the possi-
bility of a challenge to the authoritative text itself.” Not surprisingly, then,
the prosimetra examined by Balint “have the effect of undermining the
468 Histoire sociale / Social History
structure of virtue, wisdom and authority that Boethius had made canoni-
cal” (p. 77). The situation Balint describes is thus one that readers of
Flanagan’s book will also appreciate: “Somewhere between the beginning
of the high medieval reassessment of auctoritas and the firm establishment
of the papacy and the university, writers of Boethian prosimetrum created
a textual space characterized by its lack of a sure arbiter, but the cost of
maintaining this space is that those who reside there cannot provide defini-
tive solutions to the questions they raise” (p. 49).
As we might sense from such a description, these are highly complex
texts that Balint examines, and she has mastered them. She reveals their
intricacy without sacrificing clarity in her presentation. Those of us who
are not specialists in mediaeval Latin literature will find her study inviting
and illuminating for the way it combines factual evidence with literary-
critical analyses, which together open up the significance of these
sources for the study of mediaeval intellectual culture.
Of the five writings she carefully treats, Alan of Lille’s De planctu
Naturae (The Plaint of Nature) shows most clearly the genre’s potential
and limits. Alan is also the most pessimistic of the lot. It is hard not to
be intrigued by Alan, who, equating rhetorical flaws with moral ones,
viewed homosexuality on a par with the breaking of grammatical rules
(see p. 11). Playing on and fundamentally reworking Boethius’s Lady
Philosophy, the authorial Alan encounters a personified nature. Rather
than holding bickering philosophical schools responsible for the rent in
Natura’s dress, however, he implicates all of humanity in sharing culpabil-
ity for the rip. Yet vice-ridden humans are not entirely blameworthy, for
there is a flaw in nature’s cosmic design that has put us in “a no-win
situation: remain in untaught ignorance and commit the vices exemplified
by the animals or become figurative rapists of nature violently disrupting
her harmonies by intrusive rational inquiry” (p. 70). In a sense, then, we
cannot help but fall into error, for nature, “at the mercy of the vices,”
has, according to Alan, “delegated her creative authority to Venus.”
Hence “man commits sexual transgression out of vice but the vice is not
solely his,” for there is “a force at work greater than the individual
moral consciousness.” Put differently, “human sexual faults and failings
are at least in part due to the flawed way mankind is constituted.” Thus
“the complaint of nature” (planctus naturae) is not just Nature’s own com-
plaint, but the narrator’s (Alan’s) complaint about Nature herself (p. 73).
As Balint sees it, Alan’s great “anti-Consolation” (p. 75) also exposed
“the inherent difficulties of this mode of composition [Boethian prosime-
trum] and so signaled its end” (p. 137). Her study concludes with the case
for considering the cathedral school of Tours as the formative centre for
the genre’s re-emergence in the twelfth century (pp. 167–168).
Supplementing her insights and interpretations are three appendices of
translated sources. At the end, this reader recalled an observation made
at the beginning of the book. The mediaeval term for prosimetrum is
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satura, “a word that evokes a gastronomical abundance appropriate to the
inclusive and sometimes hodge-podge tendencies of the prosimetrum”
(p. 3). Balint herself, in a relatively compact and remarkably accessible
book, has managed to offer such abundance.
Sobering Anachronisms?
Bisson underscores the scholarly tendency to see in the twelfth century our
cherished ideals of modernity. He refers more than once to the “concep-
tual anachronism” of scholarship, however “excellent,” that appropriated
“concepts from the vocabulary of the modern state” (pp. 12, 491).
What about the present studies? We find a Europe at the mercy of rapa-
cious private interests beyond the reach of government, the famous and
obscure wavering in doubt, and the learned inconsolably mistrustful of
reason and authority. We might start thinking that the twelfth century
looks familiar. Have twelfth-century studies, like the emerging and more
general trend one researcher sees in current mediaeval intellectual
history, “turned postmodern”?12 Based on each author’s explicit intellec-
tual commitments, the answer is no. Bisson is unambiguous when consid-
ering the applicability of that well-known student of pouvoir: “An
historical study of power will nonetheless inevitably seem beholden to
modernism. The very concept is social scientific. . .. Even the historical
reflections on power by anti-modernist Michel Foucault betray their socio-
logical genesis” (p. 20).13 Flanagan, who enriches our knowledge of
doubt’s inherent instability, with its many forms, advantages, and disadvan-
tages marvellously illustrated, also has a taste for something she asserts is
currently out of fashion: “I would like to rehabilitate the notion of ‘enlight-
enment values’ as well, since it has become something of a whipping boy of
late” (p. 199, n. 41). Balint, while alluding to Foucault’s notion of the “care
of the self” when describing the reading practices that led to the open-
ended prosimetra she investigates, along with effectively taking up the
insights of Mikhail Bakhtin, primarily offers an immensely illuminating
study of a literary form in its historical context (pp. 49, 84). In other words,
to characterize these publications as being markedly influenced by a post-
modern outlook would be inaccurate. The authors make no such claim.
Readers, however, are a different matter. When encountering each scho-
lar’s peregrinations through twelfth-century texts, those onlookers so
inclined may take the opportunity with the present books to indulge a
12 Philipp W. Rosemann, Understanding Scholastic Thought with Foucault (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1999), p. 5: “These days research in the area of medieval philosophy has turned
‘postmodern’ — less resolutely, and certainly less consciously than other fields of medieval
studies, such as Old French, yet undeniably.”
13 For another perspective on power and postmodernism, in a context related to the religious and
intellectual traditions of the mediaeval West, see, in general, J. Joyce Schuld, Foucault and
Augustine: Reconsidering Power and Love (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2003).
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fondness for instability. That is another way of saying that the studies in
question have the potential to enrich a broad spectrum of researchers,
including the theoretically and methodologically adventurous. Readers
will not only see the effectiveness of the traditional historical-critical and
philological approaches; they will also come away with a sense that
more is left to be done: the three studies exude the richness of twelfth-
century sources with interpretive challenges that will also captivate those
engaged in other kinds of scholarly practices.
As has been the case in the critical reception of the earlier research on
the period, the question of anachronism will remain a sensitive one when
these challenges are taken up. It is not always easy to tell what is fair game
when drawing on present cultural artifacts to illuminate the experiences of
mediaeval people. Besides referring to advice columns, Flanagan intrigu-
ingly concludes her study of mediaeval uncertainty with observations on
the contemporary “‘What Would Jesus Do?’ phenomena” and the
Broadway play Doubt, recently made into a popular movie (pp. 196,
202). These and similar current examples seem to be presented as sugges-
tive continuities with the twelfth-century experience of doubt; at least, the
similarities strike this reader more than the differences. As has already
been stated, Bisson is especially sensitive to the snares of anachronism.
Even so, the murder of Charles the Good is called “the Kennedy assassi-
nation of the twelfth century” (p. 260). It is a tremendously powerful turn
of phrase; it rings true; it is as compelling as the massive data he has
accumulated.
It also brings to mind, once more, that haunting scene. Because poor
Durand does not know government as we do, we are called “to imagine
in his place,” as if it were possible for us to span both worlds, to be the
bridge between them, to pick up where his terrible experience left off,
for we have moved on to something else in the evolution of social
relations. It is an arresting moment. As the book comes to its end, we
too are stopped, standing between the past that was Durand’s world and
the future he would never know. Obviously, that pause entails a gaze in
two (temporal) directions. Not only are we able to imagine what
Durand could not, namely, the government that lies in a time beyond his
horrendous experience; we also have the capacity to imagine our
present hinging on his past; and the continuation of violence, I think, fur-
nishes our abiding link. We realize, when we are looking both ways, that we
are able to see farther than Durand not because we are standing on the
“shoulders of giants,” to recall a twelfth-century saying still quoted
today, but because we are standing on a kneeling peasant. Government
came as a “resolution” for such humiliating experiences as his.
It therefore seems easy to imagine Durand’s ordeal of cruelty; imposs-
ible for him, in Bisson’s view, to imagine anything resembling our experi-
ence of government. As far as envisaging such a future goes, the period’s
schoolmen are hardly different from that poor villager. They too are in the
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“cocoon of lordship” (p. 454), and their manner of thinking Bisson also
makes remarkably familiar to us: the masters “sense of evil — and of arbi-
trariness and violence — was in our terms, a default mode of cognition”
(p. 448). Even if “ways of doing things, of talking, evolve” (p. 491), past
violence has resonances we can still hear, a language we can still translate.
Our own shadowed “peace of the times” is apparent whenever we board a
plane.
Of course, we are also told that this experience of “arbitrary” violence
was more common to mediaeval people than it is to us.14 The assertion is
striking not as a debatable point but in terms of the label’s provenance:
Hannah Arendt, a thinker concerned with a crisis not of the Middle
Ages but of modernity, spoke of violence’s “arbitrariness,” as well as
evil’s “banality.” After a very brief allusion to Arendt at the beginning
of the book, Bisson repeatedly uses “arbitrary” and “banal” to describe
the twelfth-century experience of lordship, violence, and power. Of
course, they are the stock terms of his field; one wants to resist making
too much of them beyond the context of specialized historiography. At
the same time, it is hard for a reader to forget, whenever the words
come up, that the mediaeval historian and the political philosopher
exchanged a knowing glance at the crossroads before going their separate
ways. If we could be permitted to imagine that brief exchange, it would be
an amicable one: “How little we know about the human experience of
power!” Arendt would agree, and add a bolstering statement she liked
quoting: “The problems of violence still remain very obscure.”15 “Yet the
evidence is there,” the historian would reply, “however problematic it
may seem.”
As we come to our own parting, we find the twelfth century still holding
our concentration, though the books discussed here suggest that, as the
lens turns, different (sometimes darker) features, not so apparent to
earlier historians seeing the period’s luminous renaissance, come into
view. There are moments when all three books seem to show the age of
grandeur unravelling on the page. We meet, obviously, a distant world
unlike ours; sometimes, though, it appears more familiar than strange,
and the accumulated force in these evocations of the period’s breaking
points is enough to make a sober historian stagger.
J. K. Kitchen
University of Alberta
14 Bisson, The Crisis of the Twelfth Century, p. 7, with Hannah Arendt, “On Violence,” in Crises of the
Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), p. 110.
15 Arendt, “On Violence,” p. 51. She has in mind Georges Sorel’s Reflections on Violence, originally
published in 1906.
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